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ANIMUS AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE AND JUDICIAL
PRUDENCE
Daniel O. Conkle*
In his important book, Professor William D. Araiza has
explained, defended, and elaborated a doctrine of unconstitutional
animus.1 Based largely on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,2 this doctrine rules out, as
constitutionally impermissible, laws and other governmental
actions that are motivated by animus. As Araiza explains, when
government acts on the basis of animus, it neither advances, nor
even attempts to advance, a public-regarding interest or objective.3
Instead, it acts on the basis of nothing more than bias, dislike, or
disfavor toward the group of people who are targeted by the law,
treating that group as subordinate, inferior, or unworthy simply
because of who they are.4
* © 2019 by Daniel O. Conkle. Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law Emeritus,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana
University Bloomington. This Essay is a revised and expanded version of a symposium
paper that I presented at Stetson University College of Law on April 20, 2018. I am grateful
to the College of Law for sponsoring the symposium, to Professor William D. Araiza for
inviting me to participate, and to my fellow symposium participants for their comments and
insights.
1. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017).
Somewhat similar but distinctive arguments have been made by others, including
Professors Dale Carpenter and Susannah W. Pollvogt. See Dale Carpenter, Windsor
Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183; Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. For Araiza, the “fundamental goal” of animus doctrine is “to ensure that [legislation
and other governmental action] promotes a public purpose, or at least seeks to.” ARAIZA,
supra note 1, at 175; see id. at 151 (“[A]nimus doctrine’s underlying concern [is] ensuring
that government decision making is motivated by legitimate, public-regarding goals.”).
4. Thus, “the fundamental question animus doctrine asks” is this: “Is the law really
aimed at burdening a group for its own sake, out of simple disapproval of that group as
human beings?” Id. at 142–43. See id. at 87–88 (explaining that animus can be uncovered
through an objective inquiry into “constructed” intent, but noting that subjective dislike
remains the reference point); see also id. at 7 (“[S]ubjective dislike of a group lies at the core
of legislation we can legitimately condemn as based in animus.”); Carpenter, supra note 1,
at 185 (suggesting that animus doctrine constitutionalizes a governmental “duty not to act
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According to Araiza, animus-based governmental action is
categorically unconstitutional.5 There is no need to show that the
animus is linked to purposeful discrimination on a constitutionally
forbidden ground, such as race under the Equal Protection Clause
or religion under the First Amendment.6 Instead, animus is an
independent constitutional violation.7 Nor can animus-based
lawmaking ever be justified, not even under constitutional strict
scrutiny.8 Rather, as Professor Susannah W. Pollvogt has
explained, animus acts as “a doctrinal silver bullet,” meaning that
“no law found to be based in animus should be permitted to stand.”9
To date, the Supreme Court has relied on animus as an
independent basis for constitutional invalidation in four cases—
what Professor Dale Carpenter has called “an animus
quadrilogy.”10 First, in its 1973 decision in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,11 the Court found that a
federal food-stamp restriction was tainted by “a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” namely, “hippies”
who were forming households of unrelated individuals.12 Second,
in 1985, the Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center13
found that a Texas city’s decision to deny a group-home zoning
permit “rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
maliciously toward a person or group”); id. at 245 (“Animus is a desire to disparage and to
injure a person or group of people.”); cf. Pollvogt, supra note 1, at 926 (urging a broader view
of animus, according to which “animus is present where the public laws are harnessed to
create and enforce distinctions between social groups—that is, groups of persons identified
by status rather than conduct”).
5. ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 105–19.
6. The First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses generally forbid
purposeful discrimination favoring or disfavoring either religion in general or any particular
religion. See DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 57–60 (2016)
(explaining these constitutional prohibitions).
7. To be sure, assertions of animus can be linked to claims of purposeful discrimination
on a constitutionally forbidden ground. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416–
23 (2018) (considering, but rejecting under deferential review, a claim that presidential
travel restrictions were motivated by animus and therefore were purposefully designed to
discriminate against Muslims in violation of the Establishment Clause); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–32 (2018) (finding that
a state civil rights commission violated the Free Exercise Clause when it acted with hostility
toward a Christian baker who had objected on First Amendment grounds to creating a
custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple). However, no such linkage is required.
8. ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 105–19.
9. Pollvogt, supra note 1, at 930, quoted in WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT
INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 117–18 (2017).
10. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 183.
11. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
12. Id. at 534.
13. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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[disabled], including those who would occupy the [proposed]
facility.”14 Third, in Romer v. Evans,15 a 1996 decision, the Justices
concluded that a Colorado state constitutional amendment barring
anti-discrimination protections for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects.”16 And finally, in United States v. Windsor,17 decided in
2013, the Court found that the Defense of Marriage Act, which
adopted a federal definition of marriage that excluded same-sex
couples, was animus-based because it was intended by Congress to
“injure,” “disapprov[e],” “stigma[tize],” “demean,” and “degrade”
same-sex married couples.18
With these cases providing the backdrop, this Essay will focus
on animus as an independent constitutional violation and on the
propriety of the Supreme Court’s invocation of this doctrine. More
specifically, it will evaluate the doctrine of animus, as articulated
by Professor Araiza, from each of two perspectives: first, as a
matter of constitutional principle, and second, as a matter of
judicial prudence. By constitutional principle, I mean principle or
principles that can fairly be derived from the Constitution, taking
proper account of historical and evolving values and relevant
judicial precedents.19 Constitutional principles embody the
meaning of the Constitution, including, in this case, the Equal
Protection Clause.20 By judicial prudence, I mean judicial regard
for other factors, apart from constitutional principles pure and
simple, in the formulation of constitutional doctrine.
Two prudential factors are highly relevant here. The first is
judicial workability. This consideration addresses practical
considerations, asking whether a particular doctrinal formulation
reflects rules or standards that courts are well-suited to apply in a
competent, coherent, and consistent manner. The second is judicial
statesmanship. This factor addresses more subtle but equally
important matters of judicial discretion and judgment. Judicial
statesmanship is an appropriate consideration for the Supreme
Court, which is, after all, not only a court but also the principal

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 450.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 632.
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
Id. at 751, 768, 769, 770, 772, 774.
So understood, constitutional principles can be originalist or non-originalist.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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steward of our Constitution. Through its decisions, the Court
enforces constitutional principles that emerge from particular
constitutional provisions. But the Court plays a broader role in our
constitutional democracy, a role that transcends its particular
holdings. The Court’s opinions—readily accessible to the public,
now more than ever—speak to political actors and citizens. And
what the Court says matters. It can influence the character,
vibrancy, and durability of our democratic system.
To anticipate my conclusion, I will argue that animus doctrine
is sound as a matter of constitutional principle but highly
problematic as a matter of judicial prudence—in part due to
workability concerns, but especially from the standpoint of judicial
statesmanship. As a result, I will contend that animus should be a
doctrine of last resort, to be invoked only when there is no viable
and preferable doctrinal alternative.
I. EVALUATING ANIMUS DOCTRINE
From the standpoint of constitutional principle, Professor
Araiza’s argument is compelling. Properly understood, the
Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, precludes
animus-based lawmaking. As Araiza notes, even Justice Scalia—
who harshly criticized the Court’s animus rulings in Romer21 and
Windsor22—conceded that “it is our moral heritage that one should
not hate any human being or class of human beings,”23 much less
enact that hatred into law. More generally, the prohibition on
animus-based lawmaking is part of a broader constitutional
principle, one that prohibits what Professor Cass R. Sunstein once
called “naked preferences.”24 In other words, the Constitution
demands that every law serve a public-regarding interest or
objective or, at a minimum, that it at least be intended to do so. As
Araiza argues, this requirement connects historically not only to
James Madison’s concerns about factions, as expressed in the
Federalist Papers,25 but also to the “class legislation”

21. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 791–802 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoted in WILLIAM D. ARAIZA,
ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 79 (2017).
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984).
25. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 11–14.
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jurisprudence of the nineteenth century.26 As a matter of
constitutional principle, Araiza is right: animus-based lawmaking
violates deep-seated constitutional understandings and should be
regarded as categorically impermissible.
Although a doctrine of unconstitutional animus is thus
persuasive, indeed compelling, as a matter of constitutional
principle, such a doctrine raises significant issues of judicial
prudence. Professor Araiza concedes that the doctrine raises
potential difficulties along these lines, and he attempts to address
them, albeit without using the precise terminology or inquiry I
have proposed.27 Again, I have suggested that the inquiry into
judicial prudence requires the consideration of two factors: judicial
workability and judicial statesmanship.
With respect to judicial workability, Araiza does not deny that
if we look only to the Supreme Court’s own statements, animus
doctrine may seem amorphous and difficult to apply.28 But he goes
beyond (or beneath) the Court’s language to construct an
explanatory doctrinal framework, suggesting that this framework
is consistent with the Court’s animus rulings and much of its
reasoning.29 In other words, he argues that animus doctrine can
and should be understood as he suggests.
In particular, Araiza contends that the Court’s animus
inquiry, properly understood, is analogous to its use of the
Arlington Heights30 evidentiary framework and burden-shifting
approach for resolving claims of purposeful racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court relies on that
framework in evaluating assertions that the government has
intentionally discriminated on the basis of race even when it

26. See id. at 14–28.
27. See id. at 73–75 (discussing aspects of what I am calling judicial workability); id. at
128–31, 156–57 (discussing aspects of what I am calling judicial statesmanship).
28. See id. at 73–75 (highlighting doctrinal ambiguities, inconsistencies, and tensions).
29. See id. at 75 (explaining that the “raw materials” of the Court’s animus decisions
can be used “to construct a coherent structure”).
30. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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claims that it has not.31 Araiza contends that a similar, but not
identical, approach governs here.32
According to Araiza, the challenger in an animus case, as in
the Arlington Heights situation, can rely on various sorts of direct
and circumstantial evidence, including the adverse impact of the
governmental action, its historical background, specific evidence in
the legislative or administrative record, and/or substantive or
procedural departures from standard legal practices.33 Based on
evidence of this kind, the challenger is required to show that
“animus may be lurking as a motivation for the challenged
action.”34 If the challenger makes that showing, the burden shifts
to the government, which can rebut the suggestion of animus only
by demonstrating, under a heightened form of rational basis
review, that the law in fact was designed to serve one or more
legitimate, public-regarding interests.35
Araiza explains that animus might be found in the subjective
motivations of lawmakers, in their implementation of constituent
biases, or on the basis of other contextual considerations.36 In any
event, if the Arlington Heights-like inquiry leads the Court to
conclude that a law indeed was animus-based, the law is not
merely presumed to be unconstitutional; that is, a finding of
animus does not merely trigger heightened scrutiny, whether
strict or intermediate. Instead, an animus-based law is
categorically unconstitutional, and the government simply cannot
overcome this finding.37
Professor Araiza’s doctrinal (re)formulation is a helpful
response to the problem of workability. One might complain that
it is Araiza’s doctrine—not the Court’s. But as Araiza explains, his
conceptualization is largely, if not entirely, consistent with what

31. Under Arlington Heights, the equal protection challenger initially must show that
race was “a motivating factor” in the government’s decision-making process. Id. at 265–66.
If the challenger makes that showing, the burden shifts to the government, which, to avoid
a finding of purposeful racial discrimination, must demonstrate “that the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.” Id. at 270–
71 n.21.
32. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that “the factors the Court uses to uncover
discriminatory intent also help uncover animus” but “the animus investigation is slightly
different”).
33. Id. at 89–104, 120–38.
34. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 139–43.
36. Id. at 74, 138.
37. Id. at 105–19.
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the Court itself has said and done. Araiza’s interpretation and
elaboration of the Court’s doctrine is entirely reasonable, and it is
a substantial improvement on the Court’s own articulations, giving
animus doctrine considerably greater clarity and coherence. Even
so, questions of workability remain, notably including the core
definitional question: exactly what counts as forbidden animus?38
For example, what if the belief in question is a religious belief
about human nature or personal morality? In the context of
homosexuality, Lawrence v. Texas39 ruled out personal morality,
including religious morality, as a basis for criminalizing
homosexual conduct.40 More to the point, the Court in Windsor
suggested that congressional reliance on similar religious and
moral claims supported its conclusion that the Defense of Marriage
Act was animus-based.41 But Windsor’s finding of animus
depended on other considerations as well,42 and the Court in
Obergefell v. Hodges,43 even as it embraced marriage equality,
conspicuously declined to “disparage” what it called “decent and
honorable religious or philosophical” opposition to same-sex
marriage.44
More generally, religious beliefs about human nature or
personal morality are not easily equated with animus, at least not
invariably, in that they do not necessarily entail hatred, dislike, or
disfavor for a group of people as such. Such beliefs (whether sound
or misguided) typically reflect religious perspectives about how
people should live their lives and structure their interpersonal
relationships. The beliefs might disapprove competing paths,

38. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 184 (“There is little consensus about what animus
is.”).
39. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40. Id. at 571, 577–78.
41. As support for its animus ruling in Windsor, the Court cited a congressional report
“express[ing] ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’”
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 771 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16
(1996)).
42. See id. at 764–75 (emphasizing the broad reach and adverse effects of the challenged
provision and its unusual interference with state-law definitions of marriage).
43. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
44. Id. at 2602. After making this observation, the Court continued, seemingly shifting
from the motivation or purpose underlying marriage prohibitions to a concern about their
exclusionary and stigmatizing effect on same-sex couples: “But when . . . sincere, personal
opposition [to same-sex marriage] becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans
or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.” Id.
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regarding those paths as less desirable, wrong, or even, in religious
terms, sinful. When are such beliefs “decent and honorable” and
when are they animus-based?45 To be sure, one might argue that
the Constitution categorically forbids lawmaking on the basis of
contested understandings of human nature or personal morality,
however “decent and honorable” they might be, or that, in any
event, such lawmaking is always impermissible if the
understandings are religious in derivation.46 But without some
further explanation or clarification it seems tendentious to
describe the lawmaking as animus-based.47
Even if animus can be defined appropriately and with
sufficient clarity, there remains the problem of mixed motives or
mixed purposes48—a problem that arises when a law is based in
part on animus but in part on other, public-regarding objectives.
As noted earlier, Araiza argues that if a challenger can show that
animus may have been lurking as the motivation for a law, the
45. Consider the traditional religious adage, “Hate the sin, love the sinner.” Cf. Steven
D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 683 (2014) (“[I]f we
are to live peacefully and with mutual respect in a morally pluralistic society, it is
imperative that we be able to approve or disapprove of different kinds of conduct, or even of
different ways of life, without thereby being deemed to have depreciated the humanity of
people who live in ways we disapprove.”).
46. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (reading the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause to require that lawmaking be supported by a “secular legislative
purpose”); cf. Gary J. Simson, Religion by Any Other Name? Prohibitions on Same-Sex
Marriage and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132, 179–
84 (2012) (arguing that a reasonable observer would conclude that same-sex marriage
prohibitions endorsed religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, a legislative
objective that was unconstitutional but that was not based in animus); id. at 181, 184
(noting that, unlike a finding of animus, a finding that lawmakers improperly endorsed
religion does not disparage the lawmakers as “fundamentally bad people” but instead
permits the possibility that their legislative action was wrong but “well-intentioned”).
47. Professors Carpenter and Pollvogt have addressed the relationship between animus
and morality, including religious morality, both in the context of homosexuality and more
generally. Professor Carpenter has argued that “[i]t is unconstitutional animus for the
government to target homosexuals simply because it morally disapproves of
homosexuality.” Carpenter, supra note 1, at 188. More broadly, he suggests that “moral
condemnation expressed in law” should be treated as animus-based when “experience and
empirical learning” have undermined the underlying moral perspective, revealing it to be
“a prejudice, an unthinking and anachronistic holdover from an earlier time.” Id. at 240.
Professor Pollvogt agrees that “bare moral disapproval of homosexual conduct or
homosexual identity” should be equated with animus. Pollvogt, supra note 1, at 891, 921–
24. But she goes beyond Carpenter in concluding, more generally, that laws should be
treated as animus-based when “they function to express and enforce private bias against a
particular social group, regardless of whether that bias itself is widely held or based in
moral or religious considerations” and without “distinguish[ing] between ‘legitimate’ and
‘illegitimate’ biases.” Id. at 907 & n.105.
48. One might distinguish motives from purposes, but in the current discussion I am
treating these concepts interchangeably.
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government must respond by demonstrating, under a heightened
form of rational basis scrutiny, that the law in fact was designed
to serve one or more other, legitimate purposes.49 But what if that
scrutiny leads a court to conclude that animus and non-animus
objectives both contributed to the law’s enactment?
If the Arlington Heights approach is adopted here, the
ultimate question is whether animus was a determinative, but-for
reason for the law’s adoption.50 In other words, was animus
essential to the law’s enactment, or would the law have been
enacted anyway, on the basis of other, public-regarding objectives?
It is not clear that Araiza endorses the but-for test in the animus
context. At one point, citing Professor Carpenter,51 he implies that
perhaps the ultimate question in a mixed-motives case is
somewhat different: whether animus “strongly” or “materially”
influenced the law’s adoption.52 In any event, the judicial
resolution of mixed-motives questions—whether under the but-for
test or some other standard53—will often be fraught with difficult
questions of fact and judgment, raising significant workability
concerns.54
This discussion suggests that, despite Professor Araiza’s
helpful efforts, animus doctrine requires further clarification and
elaboration before it can be declared a workable doctrine.
Moreover, as I will explain, animus doctrine raises other
prudential concerns, relating to what I have called judicial
statesmanship.55 In my view, these concerns, even more than
workability considerations, suggest that the Supreme Court’s
49. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
50. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 n.21
(1977) (adopting this approach in the context of discriminatory intent).
51. Like Professor Araiza, Professor Carpenter invokes the Arlington Heights
framework to a degree. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 243–48. Rather than adopt the Arlington
Heights but-for test as such, however, Carpenter suggests that animus challenges should
succeed if animus “materially influenced” adoption of the law, that is, if animus was a
“substantial factor in passage.” Id. at 232. He also suggests that the burden-shifting
approach of Arlington Heights is not directly relevant in this setting. Id. at 247.
52. ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 118 (citing Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal
Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 232); see also id. at 126–27 (noting that
his approach is similar to Carpenter’s and that “there is . . . good wisdom in recognizing that
a smidgen of animus should probably not suffice to fatally infect a statute”).
53. See generally Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J.
1106 (2018) (categorizing and explaining various legal approaches to mixed motives).
54. But cf. id. at 1113 (suggesting that, properly understood, “[m]ixed motive analysis
is much easier than commonly thought”).
55. Araiza acknowledges and attempts to address concerns along these lines, albeit not
to the extent that he addresses workability. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 128–31, 156–57.
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animus doctrine is not a prudent vehicle for invalidating laws and
governmental actions—that is, assuming there is a viable and
preferable doctrinal alternative.
When the Court declares that a law is based in animus, it is
issuing what can fairly be described as an indictment of those
responsible for the law. Indeed, the Court’s declaration can be seen
as a moral indictment of the lawmakers (whether legislators or
citizens acting by referendum) because it implies a moral defect in
their character. To refrain from hatred, animosity, and bias in the
making of law is a constitutional obligation, but it is a moral duty
as well, part of what Justice Scalia called “our moral heritage.”56
As Professor Carpenter has noted, animus doctrine thus reflects a
“moral and sometimes constitutional duty not to act maliciously
toward a person or group of people.”57 For the Court to accuse
lawmakers of violating this duty is a serious charge, a form of
moral condemnation.
The intensity of the Court’s condemnation may vary by
context. A judicial declaration of animus may be especially
condemnatory if the Court is directly addressing the lawmakers’
subjective motivations. As Professor Araiza suggests, the critique
may be less biting if the Court instead refers to legislative reliance
on the prejudices or stereotypes of constituents or to objective
indicators of constructive intent.58 Be that as it may, an accusation
of animus, whatever the context, is plainly disparaging. One might
attempt to redefine the word, but in both legal and general
understanding, “animus” suggests a malicious sentiment that is
entirely without justification.59 Thus, when the Court declares that
a law is animus-based, it is declaring—or, at a minimum, it will be
understood to be declaring—that the law is based on nothing more

56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoted in WILLIAM
D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 79 (2017). Ironically, as
Professor Steven D. Smith has explained, the moral consensus on this point—combined with
dissensus and disarray concerning other moral claims and perspectives—has made
assertions of hatred or bias increasingly attractive in contemporary public discourse. Smith,
supra note 45, at 690–96. According to Smith, the same dynamic may help explain—but
does not excuse—the judicial tendency to rely on animus. Id. at 696–98.
57. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 185.
58. ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 48, 52, 58–60, 73–74, 169.
59. See, e.g., id. at 142–43 (equating “animus” with “simple disapproval of [a] group as
human beings”); Carpenter, supra note 1, at 245 (“Animus is a desire to disparage and to
injure a person or group of people.”); Animus, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/animus (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (defining
“animus” as “a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or malevolent ill will”).

2019]

Animus and Its Alternatives

205

than bias, hatred, or dislike, what the Court has called “a bare . . .
desire to harm”60 the disadvantaged group. As Chief Justice
Roberts suggested in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, such a
declaration almost inevitably “tar[s] the political branches with
the brush of bigotry.”61
But what if the lawmakers deserve to be indicted or
condemned? After all, sometimes an indictment—even a strong
indictment, even a moral indictment—is warranted. And to my
mind, animus-based lawmaking is just such a case. Not only is
such lawmaking strictly forbidden as a matter of constitutional
principle; it also violates widely shared notions of morality and
human decency. It deserves to be not only criticized, but also
condemned.
Even so, there are competing prudential considerations,
linked in part to judicial workability but mainly to judicial
statesmanship. As I have noted, there are difficult practical
questions surrounding the precise meaning of animus, the issue of
mixed motives, and the relationship between animus and
traditional religious beliefs.62 More important, judicial
declarations of animus are likely to exacerbate the animosity that
infects contemporary American politics, damaging the democratic
system that the Constitution is designed to protect.
America today is being torn apart by sharply worded political
rhetoric and extreme political polarization, trends that are
threatening the very fabric of our democracy.63 Our deepest
divisions are cultural—urban versus rural, elite versus populist,
secular versus religious. Partisan allegiances are increasingly
tribal, and political disagreements are increasingly infused with
name-calling and personal attacks, treating those on the other side
as not merely opponents but enemies.64 Our divisions and
animosities have reached a new and disturbing level during the
tumultuous presidency of Donald J. Trump. But these trends
60. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
61. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 776 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
62. See supra notes 38–54 and accompanying text.
63. Professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt highlight this concern in their recent
book: “The mounting assault on norms of mutual toleration and forbearance—mostly,
though not entirely, by Republicans—has eroded the soft guardrails that long protected us
from the kind of partisan fight to the death that has destroyed democracies in other parts
of the world.” STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 174–75 (2018).
64. See id. at 174 (“[I]n a polarized society, treating rivals as enemies can be useful—
and . . . the pursuit of politics as warfare can be appealing to those who fear they have much
to lose. But war always has its price.”).
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predate the rise of Trump, and, indeed, his rise to power may be a
response to these trends no less than a cause.65
This us-versus-them political fracture is especially acute on
issues of the sort that animus doctrine has addressed in the past
and might address in the future—issues relating to sexual
orientation and transgender rights. Invoking animus in resolving
such disputes may be sound as a matter of constitutional principle,
but it fans the flames of our cultural conflagrations. Ironically, a
judicial declaration of animus may perpetuate and promote
animus and similar sentiments in the political domain, with those
so accused treating the assertion as elitist, disrespectful, insulting,
and condescending. And if their values are religiously inspired,
they are likely to see the charge as an assault on religion and
religious liberty, deepening their sense of resentment, affront, and
alienation. As Professor Steven D. Smith has suggested, “[i]t is
hard to imagine a jurisprudence better calculated to undermine
inclusiveness, destroy mutual respect, and promote cultural
division.”66
I do not mean to exaggerate the Supreme Court’s impact on
America’s political-cultural divisions, which are the product of
many and various factors. As the primary steward of our
constitutional democracy, however, the Court should strive to
promote, not impair, the prospect of civil and respectful political
discourse. It should not take action that exacerbates our
contemporary political turmoil unless the competing demands of
constitutional principle imperatively require it. In my view,
therefore, judicial prudence generally, and judicial statesmanship
in particular, counsel against the use of animus doctrine. It should
be a doctrine of last resort, to be utilized only when there is no
viable and preferable doctrinal alternative. Determining whether
such an alternative exists, of course, itself requires attention to
matters of constitutional principle and judicial prudence.

65. According to the Pew Research Center, political polarization had surged
dramatically by 2012, with most of the increase occurring during the presidencies of George
W. Bush and Barack Obama. Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (June 4, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/partisanpolarization-surges-in-bush-obama-years/.
66. Smith, supra note 45, at 700.
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II. EVALUATING DOCTRINAL ALTERNATIVES
In my judgment, the Supreme Court does have a viable and
preferable doctrinal alternative in most cases involving animus
claims. As I noted at the outset, to date there are only four cases—
the “animus quadrilogy”67—in which the Court has relied on
animus as an independent basis for constitutional invalidation:
Moreno,68 Cleburne,69 Romer,70 and Windsor.71 In three of them, the
Court could and should have relied instead on its established equal
protection doctrine for suspect and quasi-suspect classifications.
Thus, in Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor, the Court could and
should have declared the challenged classifications—mental
disability in Cleburne and sexual orientation in Romer and
Windsor—quasi-suspect and therefore subject to heightened,
intermediate scrutiny, which the government plainly could not
have satisfied.72 This would hardly have been a doctrinal
innovation. Indeed, relying on the Supreme Court’s own
precedents, this was precisely the path taken by the lower courts
in Cleburne73 and Windsor.74
This strand of equal protection, no less than animus doctrine,
is fundamentally sound as a matter of constitutional principle. It
is supported by a longstanding body of case law, and it derives from
the core historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—
preventing racial discrimination against the newly freed slaves—
with the Supreme Court reasoning by analogy as the Court extends
that purpose to other, comparable forms of discrimination.75
67. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 183.
68. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
69. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
70. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
71. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
72. A ruling of this sort in Romer probably would have required the Court to overrule
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as it later did in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
73. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 195–202 (5th Cir. 1984),
aff’d on other grounds in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
74. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–88 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other
grounds, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see also Smith Kline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d
471, 480–84 (9th Cir. 2014) (adopting heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation
classifications after finding that the Supreme Court itself applied heightened scrutiny in
Windsor, albeit not explicitly).
75. See Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND.
L.J. 27, 34–35 (2014) (explaining the Court’s reasoning and summarizing its case law). I
realize that the suspect and quasi-suspect strand of equal protection doctrine has been
criticized, sometimes quite strongly. Professor Pollvogt, for example, has argued that it
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Turning to considerations of judicial prudence, one might
argue that this branch of equal protection doctrine is, or has
become, unworkable. Professor Araiza, for example, cites the
ubiquity of governmental classifications on various grounds and in
various settings, the ever-increasing diversity of American society,
and especially “[t]he crumbling of older binaries—black/white,
Catholic/Protestant, and today, even male/female.”76 But recall
that the suspect and quasi-suspect strand of equal protection is
being considered as an alternative to animus, which has
significant workability issues of its own. The identification of
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications is not an exact science,
and the task may require adaptation to new circumstances. But
the inquiry is not beyond the judicial ken, and, in any event, it is
no less workable than animus doctrine.
In identifying suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, the
Supreme Court, analogizing to race, has relied on various
considerations. As I have explained elsewhere, three criteria have
dominated the inquiry:
First, is the classifying trait, like race, an immutable personal
characteristic—an accident of birth beyond a person’s control or
responsibility—rendering it presumptively unjust for the
government to use the trait as a basis for allocating rewards or
penalties? Second, is the trait, like race, broadly irrelevant to
legitimate generalization, rendering discrimination on this
basis not only unfair but also indefensible in a wide range of
governmental settings? And third, is the disadvantaged group,
like African-Americans and other racial minorities, a group
that lacks political power and that therefore warrants special
judicial solicitude, that is, special protection from the ordinary
operation of the political process?77

works to inhibit, not promote, an appropriate evaluation of equality claims. Pollvogt, supra
note 1, at 897–98; Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 739, 796–98 (2014). I appreciate the force of these criticisms, but I continue to
believe that this doctrine, properly understood and properly applied, is fundamentally
sound as a matter of constitutional principle.
76. ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 130; see id. at 129–30 (arguing that it is increasingly
difficult to make generalized, across-the-board determinations that different types of
classifications warrant different levels of constitutional scrutiny); cf. Pollvogt, supra note
75, at 796 (contending that “the Court’s suspect classification jurisprudence does not
present a coherent or particularly workable doctrinal framework”).
77. Conkle, supra note 75, at 34. This inquiry requires the Court to make judgments of
fact and value, but its judgments can be informed by evolving societal values. See id. at 35–
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Conducting an inquiry along these lines, the Court has extended
suspect or quasi-suspect status—and therefore strict or
intermediate scrutiny—to various nonracial classifications,
including classifications based on alienage,78 sex,79 and
illegitimacy.80
To be sure, mental disability does not perfectly fit the Supreme
Court’s criteria, but it fits well enough to warrant quasi-suspect
status and intermediate scrutiny, as the Fifth Circuit concluded in
Cleburne.81 Likewise, sexual orientation meets the criteria rather
well,82 even if the concept of immutability might require some
relaxation or modification, as the Second Circuit suggested in its
Windsor decision.83 Similar reasoning, moreover, could readily be
extended to gender-identity discrimination, triggering heightened
scrutiny and leading to invalidation in most settings. Lower courts
have already moved strongly in this direction.84
With respect to sexual orientation, the reasoning I have
suggested would have charted a clear path to the Court’s marriage
36 (arguing that changing societal values properly have influenced the extension of suspect
or quasi-suspect treatment to forms of discrimination that had been tolerated in the past).
78. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
79. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (explaining why sex-based classifications warrant
heightened scrutiny).
80. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
81. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 195–98 (5th Cir. 1984),
aff’d on other grounds in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
82. See Conkle, supra note 75, at 36–37 (applying the three criteria and arguing that
changing societal values provide additional support for heightened scrutiny in this context).
83. The Second Circuit concluded that whether or not it is strictly immutable, “sexual
orientation is a sufficiently distinguishing characteristic to identify the discrete minority
class of homosexuals.” Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on
other grounds, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
84. A law or policy that discriminates against transgender individuals can be seen as a
form of sex discrimination, thus rendering the law or policy a quasi-suspect, sex-based
classification triggering heightened, intermediate scrutiny as a matter of established
doctrine. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1050–52
(7th Cir. 2017) (adopting this reasoning). Moreover, even apart from that argument, a
number of courts have ruled that discrimination on the basis of transgender status, as such,
is quasi-suspect or even fully suspect, leading to intermediate or even full-fledged strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749–50 (E.D.
Va. 2018) (finding sex-based discrimination but also concluding that transgender
classifications are “at least . . . quasi-suspect” in their own right); Karnoski v. Trump, No.
C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018) (finding transgender
classifications fully suspect and therefore subject to “the most exacting level of scrutiny”);
id. (“[C]ourts have consistently found that transgender people constitute, at minimum, a
quasi-suspect class.”); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208–11 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding
sex-based discrimination but also concluding that transgender classifications are quasisuspect).
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equality ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.85 The Court managed to
avoid animus reasoning in Obergefell, but its doctrinal analysis
was hardly straightforward, and, as Professor Araiza has
suggested, its opinion arguably relied indirectly on animus
concerns.86 In any event, the alternative doctrinal path that I have
outlined—invoking heightened, intermediate scrutiny for
discrimination based on sexual orientation—would have provided
a more coherent and persuasive doctrinal underpinning for the
Court’s decision.87 Denying marriage rights to same-sex couples
plainly cannot be justified under such scrutiny.88
More broadly, as compared to animus doctrine, the
suspect/quasi-suspect strand of equal protection is equally sound
as a matter of constitutional principle, and it is no less workable.
With these factors largely in equipoise, the second component of
judicial prudence, that of judicial statesmanship, comes to the fore.
And this consideration makes the suspect/quasi-suspect doctrine a
superior and preferable constitutional rationale.
When the Court utilizes this doctrine, it determines its level
of scrutiny through a generalized analysis, focusing mainly on the
three criteria I have noted: immutability, general irrelevance, and
political powerlessness.89 It decides, categorically, whether
classifications on a particular ground—for example, sexual
orientation or gender identity—should be subject to heightened
scrutiny. Historical and continuing bias and prejudice are relevant
to political powerlessness, but the inquiry remains global, not
specific to the law at hand. And once the Court invokes heightened,
intermediate scrutiny, the law in question will be invalidated
unless the government can show that the law serves an interest
that is not only legitimate, but also important, and that it is welltailored to serve that interest. Most laws will fail this test, and the
Court therefore will rule them invalid.
More to the point, even if the issue of animus might be lurking,
the Court will have no occasion to address it, certainly not
85. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
86. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 163–72.
87. See Conkle, supra note 75, at 34–38 (arguing, prior to Obergefell, that this line of
reasoning provided the best constitutional justification for extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples).
88. See id. at 37–38 (explaining that same-sex marriage prohibitions, even if rational,
could not satisfy heightened scrutiny because they did not substantially advance important
governmental objectives).
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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explicitly. As a result, it will have no occasion to announce that the
law is animus-based. Thus, even as the Court finds for the
challengers, it can avoid disparaging the law’s supporters with the
sort of judicial indictment and moral condemnation that animus
doctrine entails. Our political-cultural fires may continue to burn,
but the Court will not be adding its own incendiary contribution.90
Notably, moreover, this doctrinal path would honor judicial
statesmanship without impairing equality claims. To the contrary,
equality claims would be enhanced by the elimination of any
requirement that a challenger present evidence of animus.
Instead, any and all laws embodying the quasi-suspect
classification would be subject to heightened scrutiny and probable
invalidation.91
I have discussed three of the four cases in the Supreme Court’s
“animus quadrilogy”92—Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor—
suggesting that they could and should have been decided on other
grounds. I will comment only briefly on the fourth, which,
chronologically, was actually the first. In that case—Moreno—the
Court invalidated a federal statute denying food stamps to
households of unrelated individuals, including “hippies,” with the
Court finding that the law was tainted by animus, “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”93
Given the statute’s impact on personal decisions concerning
intimate, family-like relationships, perhaps the Court in Moreno
could have grounded its ruling on substantive due process.94 But
90. The law’s supporters will still be upset by its invalidation, of course. Cf. Carpenter,
supra note 1, at 241 (“There is no nice way to tell people that policies they have fervently
supported are unconstitutional.”). But avoiding the vituperative charge of animus is no
small matter.
91. Another doctrinal path to similar results might be an understanding of the rational
basis test that permits its robust application, in selective contexts, without regard to
animus. See Katie Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317,
1356–64 (2018) (defending this understanding of the rational basis test and contending that
the test, so understood, has permitted equal protection rulings favoring social change). Such
an approach could provide constitutional protection without requiring evidence of animus
or judicial findings that laws are animus-based. But such a doctrine might be difficult to
defend as a matter of constitutional principle and judicial prudence. See id. at 1366, 1367
(noting the “unsettled, undertheorized nature of rational basis review” and the “messy
absence of clear doctrine in defining where meaningful rational basis review can be
applied”).
92. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 183.
93. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
94. Just a few years after Moreno, a plurality of the Court relied on substantive due
process to invalidate an ordinance that precluded extended-family relatives from living
together in the same house. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498–506 (1977)
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the doctrine of substantive due process raises difficult questions of
its own, both as a matter of constitutional principle and as a matter
of judicial prudence.95 In any event, if neither substantive due
process nor any other alternative ground was viable and preferable
in Moreno, then the Court’s animus ruling was proper. As I have
said, animus doctrine is compelling as a matter of constitutional
principle, and I have not argued that it should be abandoned
altogether. Rather, I have contended that it should be a doctrine of
last resort, to be utilized if, but only if, there is no viable and
preferable doctrinal alternative.96
III. CONCLUSION
Rather than treat animus as a doctrine of last resort, the
Supreme Court has instead suggested that laws can and should
be invalidated as animus-based even when there are viable,
and preferable, alternative grounds for reaching the same
results. As a matter of judicial prudence, this is a mistake.
Accordingly, in my judgment, the Court took a wrong turn
in adopting this reasoning—if not in Moreno, then at least in
Cleburne, as Justice Marshall suggested in his powerful separate
opinion.97 The Court’s reliance on animus in addressing sexual
orientation questions in Romer and Windsor likewise was a

(plurality opinion). In so doing, however, the plurality distinguished and preserved the
Court’s earlier decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), which had
permitted housing restrictions affecting individuals who were not related by “blood,
adoption, or marriage.” Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion). Belle Terre obviously
would cast doubt on a substantive due process claim in the context of Moreno, but Belle
Terre might have been wrongly decided. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that even if no formal familial relationship is present, the “choice of
household companions” warrants special constitutional protection because it “involves
deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within
the home”).
95. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 63 (2006) (discussing and evaluating three competing, and inconsistent, theories of
substantive due process).
96. In his classic article addressing the general propriety of judicial inquiries into
constitutionally impermissible motivation, Professor Paul Brest reached a somewhat
similar conclusion: “Where a court can support a judgment invalidating a decision on
grounds other than unconstitutional motivation, it usually should do so. . . . [But] a blanket
refusal to inquire into legislative and administrative motivation is not justified.” Paul Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 134 (footnote omitted).
97. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455–78 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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mistake, and the Court should not repeat the error when it
confronts transgender issues in the future.
As I have emphasized, my argument is not that animus
doctrine is unjustified as a matter of constitutional principle.
Rather, it is that animus doctrine is imprudent, as a matter of
judicial discretion and judgment, if the Court could instead rely on
a viable and preferable doctrinal alternative. It is imprudent in
part due to workability concerns, but mainly because the Supreme
Court, as a matter of judicial statesmanship, should seek to
temper, not exacerbate, the political polarization and
fragmentation that is tearing our society apart. The Court should
avoid animus doctrine when possible because it tends to inflame
our ongoing cultural conflicts, undermine civic and political
discourse, and threaten the character and strength of our
constitutional democracy.

